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THE NEWEST EQUAL PROTECTION: CITY OF
CLEBURNE AND A COMMON LAW FOR STATUTES
AND COVENANTS AFFECTING GROUP HOMES
FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED
PETER MARGULIES*
Our society has belatedly recognized the need to accommo-
date the mentally ill1 and mentally retarded. In earlier days,
* Clinical Associate Professor, New York Law School. I thank Lewis Golinker, Her-
bert Semmel, Len Rubenstein, Arlene Kanter, Marc Arkin, and Michael Perlin for their
ideas. Responsibility for the conclusions expressed in this article rests solely with the
author.
1. Mental illness usually involves conditions in three broad categories: organic disor-
ders, schizophrenic disorders, and affective disorders. Organic problems comprise a di-
verse group, but most commonly derive from aging of the brain or the ingestion of for-
eign substances, such as addictive drugs. Symptoms can include significant impairment
of intellectual ability, memory loss, and perceptual disturbances such as delusions and
hallucinations. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 101-79 (3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter referred to as DSM-
III]. Schizophrenic disorders usually develop before age 45, involve deterioration from
previous levels of functioning, and always feature delusions, hallucinations, or other
thought disturbances in some phase of the illness. See DSM-III, supra at 181-93. Symp-
toms can be alleviated through use of psychotropic drugs. See THE MERCK MANUAL OF
DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1467-68 (14th ed. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as Merck Man-
ual]. These drugs, however, may have lasting, deleterious side-effects on the central ner-
vous system. Merck Manual, supra, at 2335-36. Affective or "mood" disorders typically
involve violent shifts in mood from elation to depression, sometimes combined with
thought disturbances. See DSM- III, supra, at 205-24. In acute phases of the disease,
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), known colloquially as "shock treatment," is the clini-
cian's first resort. Merck Manual, supra at 1457. For less serious manifestations, an-
tidepressants, particularly lithium, are the treatment of choice. Id. at 1458-62.
2. Mental retardation involves "significantly subaverage" intellectual functioning and
deficits or impairments in adaptive behavior displayed before the age of 18. DSM-III,
supra note 1, at 36. Clinicians divide it into four subtypes, roughly grouped along IQ
levels: Mild (IQ 50-70); Moderate (IQ 35-49); Severe (IQ 20-34); Profound (IQ below 20).
Id. at 39. With training, mentally retarded persons can learn academic, self-care, and
social skills in degrees demarcated approximately by the above four rubrics. Id. at 39-40.
Unlike mental illness, however, mental retardation cannot be successfully "treated." No
medication or other therapy can significantly alter the intellectual thresholds set forth.
Merck Manual, supra note 1, at 1872-74.
While mental health professionals deal with mental illness and mental retardation in
different ways, courts considering the adequacy of community and institutional care
have tended to view these populations as analogous for legal purposes. See Wyatt v.
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these groups were objects of fear.' Until the 1960s, they were
confined in large state institutions,4 and suffered under comple-
mentary regimes of brutality and neglect.3 Before the 1960s, so-
ciety's concern for their life in institutions had extended only to
the point of seeking to prevent them from "polluting" the gene
Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and rem'ded
in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Halderman
v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1314 nn.49, 50, 1318 n.54 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (key inquiry is whether record reflects that particular plaintiffs "posed a dan-
ger to society").
3. See Fernald, The Burden of Feeblemindedness, 17 J. PSYCHo-ASTHENiCS 87, 90
(1913) (the retarded "cause unutterable sorrow at home and are a menace and danger to
the community"); L.M. Terman, Feeble-Minded Children in the Public Schools of Cali-
fornia, 5 SCH. & Soc'Y 161 (1917) ("only recently have we begun to recognize how serious
a menace [feeble-mindedness] is to the social, economic and moral welfare of the
state. . . . [I]t is responsible . . . for the majority of cases of chronic and semi-chronic
pauperism, and for much of our alcoholism, prostitution, and veneral diseases"), cited in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3266 n.8 (1985) (Marshall, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4. See, e.g., D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 23 (1984) [herein-
after cited as ROTHMAN). The Rothmans note that at the Willowbrook State School, a
notorious New York facility for the mentally retarded, "[bly 1963, 6,000 residents were
crammed into a space set for 4,275."
5. Robert Kennedy made an unannounced visit to Willowbrook in 1965. He later told
the press that the wards of the facility were "less comfortable and cheerful than the
cages in which we put animals in a zoo." ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 23. At least four
residents died unnecessarily in 1965, including two who were scalded to death in anti-
quated showers. Id. Yet little was done. Rothman describes the scene in 1972 when Ger-
aldo Rivera, a lawyer-turned-television reporter, surreptitiously filmed Willowbrook life:
The images had a jumpy and elusive quality. This spindly and twisted limb
was a leg; that grossly swollen organ was a head. The blotches smeared across
the wall were feces; the white fabric covering the figure in the corner was a
straitjacket. That crouching child, back to the camera, was naked and so was the
one next to him. Both of them were on the floor; there was no furniture in the
room save for a wooden bench and chair. The camera focused for a few seconds
on an oddly smiling person, the only one fully clothed. That had to be the single
attendant.
Id. at 17.
A court assessing conditions at the Pennhurst State School in Pennsylvania, a vir-
tual twin of Willowbrook, observed that defendants had conceded that the facility "does
not meet minimally acceptable professional standards." Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 446 F.Supp. at 1313. The Supreme Court, considering a different issue
in the same case, subsequently asserted that,
It is common knowledge that "insane asylums," as they were known until
the middle of this century, usually were underfunded and understaffed . . .
[p]hysical facilities, due to consistent underfunding by state legislatures, have
been grossly inadequate--especially in light of advanced knowledge and tech-
niques for the treatment of the mentally ill.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 912 n.16 (1984).
1986] THE NEWEST EQUAL PROTECTION 361
pool by creating new life.' Indeed, Justice Holmes, in a decision
upholding a compulsory sterilization law, opined with typical
forthrightness that, "three generations of imbeciles are
enough."
7
The civil rights revolution of the 1960s had a marked spil-
lover effect on the rights of the mentally handicapped.8 In 1973,
6. "Massive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the retarded ... the aim
was to halt reproduction of the retarded and 'nearly extinguish their race.' " City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3266-67 and n.9 (Marshall, J. concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), citing A. MOORE, THE FEEBLE-MINDED IN NEW YORK
3 (1911). The pseudo-science of eugenics, geared to selecting those "fit" and "unfit" to
reproduce, took hold between 1907 and 1931, as 29 states enacted compulsory steriliza-
tion laws. See 105 S. Ct. at 3267; Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 Const. Comment. 331
(1985); Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985).
7. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,207 (1927). Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). In Skinner, the Court indicated its continuing reliance on Buck v. Bell, see 316
U.S. at 539-40, 42, while striking down a state law which mandated sterilization of habit-
ual felons, but exempted embezzlers. The Court's opinion, by Justice Douglas, invoked
the equal protection clause, U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, to invalidate "such conspicu-
ously artificial lines." 316 U.S. at 542. This is an early example of equal protection "un-
derinclusiveness" doctrine. See infra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
In Buck, unlike Skinner, the plaintiff ostensibly had the benefit of procedures to
determine the need for sterilization. 274 U.S. at 206-07. But see Lombardo, supra note 6,
at 49-58; Gould, supra note 6, at 336 (hearing "cursory and contradictory"). Chief Jus-
tice Stone, concurring in Skinner, wanted to use the due process clause, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, to strike down the statute, since the plaintiff was not given a hearing to
"discover whether his criminal tendencies are of an inheritable type." 316 U.S. at 544. It
is unclear how Skinner or the non-criminal Carrie Buck, facing a similar task, could
possibly have proven that their problems were not inheritable. See Gould, supra note 6,
at 334. Nevertheless, this lack of process is the only kind explanation for the Skinner
Court's solicitude toward convicted felons, compared with the Buck Court's blithe ac-
ceptance of a state's authority to "interfere with the personal liberty of the individual to
prevent the transmission by inheritance of his socially injurious tendencies." 316 U.S. at
544 (Stone, C.J., concurring). Posterity has viewed Skinner as establishing that the right
to procreate is "fundamental," and cannot be infringed absent a "compelling state inter-
est." See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3255; Gunther, The
Supreme Court 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1972) How-
ever, it is difficult to reconcile the requirement of a compelling state interest with the
slipshod pseudo-science endorsed in Buck. The only other explanation is that the Court,
including at different times Justices Holmes and Douglas, shared the public's prejudice
against mentally retarded persons. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (uphold-
ing racial segregation); Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130 (1873) (upholding a state bar on
the practice of law by women).
8. See ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 50-54. As the authors note,
The civil rights movement encouraged women, prisoners, and eventually,
the disabled to define themselves as oppressed minorities and to search for con-
stitutional, not political, grounds for winning their rights. It taught them to
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Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act,9 which barred discrimi-
nation against the handicapped in programs or activities receiv-
ing federal funds. This statute and its subsequent amendments
mirror the language and texture of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.10 Congress also enacted the Education of the Hand-
icapped Children Act (EHA) 1 which established procedures to
provide handicapped students, formerly shut out of the educa-
tion system,1 2 with "free, appropriate public" schooling.1 3 The
EHA, as well as state law, declared that mentally handicapped
people should receive services in the "least restrictive environ-
ment" consistent with their needs."
Federal efforts have been less significant in one crucial
area-housing.15 Mentally handicapped people often encounter
think of themselves not as poor unfortunates who should be the object of pater-
nalism, but as competent individuals who had entitlements. This shift marks a
major divide in twentieth-century social thought and social action. It moves us
from Progressive protective legislation, which prohibited women from working in
strenuous occupations, to agitation for equal rights; from involuntary commit-
ment laws, which incarcerated the incompetent, to agitation for mental patients'
rights.
Id. at 51-52.
9. Vocational Rehabilitation and other Rehabilitation Services Act (Rehabilitation
Act), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. (1985). The most important provision of the Rehabilitation
Act mandates that:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . .
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
29 U.S.C. § 794.
10. Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1981), provides that:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance.
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (Supp. 1985).
12. Congress found that, "one million of the handicapped children in the United
States are excluded entirely from the school system and will not go through the educa-
tional process with their peers. ... 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(4) (Supp. 1985).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. 1985).
14. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1978). See also, e.g., Mentally Retarded Persons Act
of 1977, TEx. REv. STAT. ANN., Art. 5547-300, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
15. One federal program, known as "section 202," provides direct assistance in this
area in the form of loans for housing for the elderly and handicapped. See The National
Housing Act, 12 U.S. § 1701q (1980). Another statute permits partial federal reimburse-
ment for residential services for mentally retarded adults. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(15)
(1983).
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difficulty in living alone.' 6 Small congregate facilities in the com-
munity with resident staff are their best alternative to institu-
tionalization 17 or homelessness.' 8 However, many cities and
towns have zoning ordinances which either expressly restrict the
availability of such housing,"9 or otherwise operate "neutrally"
to produce the same effect.2 0 Some, but not all, states have
promulgated statutes overriding these laws.2'
Zoning is typically considered a state and local, 22 not fed-
eral, matter. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently consid-
16. See B. BAKER, G. SELTZER & M. SELTZER, As CLOSE As POSSIBLE: A STUDY OF COM-
MUNITY RESIDENCES FOR RETARDED ADULTS (1977) [hereinafter cited as Baker & Seltzer].
17.
[G]roup homes currently are the principal community living alternatives for per-
sons who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a home in communities
is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons who are mentally
retarded, and each factor that makes such group homes harder to establish oper-
ates to exclude persons who are mentally retarded from the community.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3253 n.6 (District Court
findings).
18. Mentally ill persons, rather than those suffering from mental retardation, are
most likely to be homeless. Until recently, the superior functioning of mentally ill per-
sons taking medication, see supra note 1, led hospitals to release them without a fixed
community placement. Often, those released found no placement but the streets. See
Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525,463 N.E.2d 588 (1984), on rem'd, 126 Misc.2d
247,481 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1984) (seeking structured community residences
for ex-psychiatric patients, now homeless).
Other homeless individuals are poor, but are free from mental disability. See Calla-
han v. Carey, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.). Many families now
fall into this category, as well. See, e.g., Koster v. Webb, 598 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
19. See, e.g., Cleburne Zoning Ordinance, Section 8, set out in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3252 n.3.
20. Most neutral ordinances restrict permissible uses to single-family occupancy, bar-
ring group homes, commercial uses, etc. See Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Ma-
con-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 252 Ga. 484, 314 S.E.2d 218 (1984),
dism'd for want of a substantial federal question, 105 S. Ct. 57 (1984); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Compare McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 498 N.Y.S.
2d 128 (Ct. App. 1985) (striking down ordinance on state constitutional grounds). Similar
limits appear in restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/
Long Island County Services Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154,460 N.E.2d 1336 (1984), app. dism'd,
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 60 (1984). See also infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., AL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1566 et. seq. (West 1979 and Supp. 1985);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-3c (Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-1614(2) (Supp. 1983); R. I.
GEN. LAWS, § 45-24-22 (1980). See also MD. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 7-102 (Supp. 1984);
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85) (saturation of community
with existing community residences is sole basis for contesting siting of new facility).
22. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding wide
ambit of discretion for zoning authorities).
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ered the validity of an expressly restrictive ordinance under the
equal protection clause. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, s the Court, in a unanimous decision, struck down the
challenged law. However, a majority of the Court declined to de-
clare that the mentally retarded constitute a suspect class, like
racial minorities, '2 4 or a quasi-suspect class, like women.2 5 A mi-
nority of the Court split on its approach. One group favored
granting the mentally retarded quasi-suspect status.2 6 The other
group argued that one standard of review was appropriate for all
equal protection cases, regardless of the group affiliation of
plaintiffs.
2 7
This article first briefly reviews the facts and law of the
Cleburne decision, summarizing the three positions which the
members of the Court espoused. It identifies a principle underly-
ing the majority's view: skepticism about radically underinclu-
sive classifications.2 8 Next, in light of Cleburne, it discusses the
23. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
24. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (provision of Social Security
Act providing benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived of pa-
rental support because of unemployment of the father but not the mother held uncon-
constitutional as not substantially related to the attainment of statutory goals); Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (provision of Social Security Act requiring that widower
prove dependency on wife in order to receive survivor's benefits held unconstitutional as
discriminating against working females by granting their spouses less protection); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (provision of Social Security Act barring wid-
ower from receiving benefits based on earnings of deceased wife held unconstitutional
based upon same rationale as Goldfarb); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(invalidating statutes which deem spouses of male members of uniformed services to be
dependents for allowance and benefits purposes, while requiring spouses of female mem-
bers to prove that they are dependent for over one-half of their support); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down Idaho probate code provision which gave preference to
men over women of equal entitlement class when appointing administrators of estates).
But see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), which held that Congress did not act
unconstitutionally in declining to authorize registration of women, as well as men, for the
draft. This result may be explained, however, by the majority's desire to uphold "Con-
gress' authority over national defense and military affairs." Id. at 2651. Justice Rehn-
quist, writing the opinion of the Court, asserted that, "in no other area has the Court
accorded Congress greater deference." Id.
26. See 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Black-
mun, concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also infra notes 87-92 and accompa-
nying text.
27. See 105 S. Ct. at 3260 (Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, concur-
ring). See also infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
28. For a pioneering discussion of this important concept, see Tussman & tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 346-53 (1949). See also infra
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utility of clear rules and more flexible standards in equal protec-
tion jurisprudence. It concludes that, in dealing with the
problems of mentally retarded persons, a seemingly simple rule
might prove to be more troublesome than the broad standard
which the Court adopted.29
The situation which the Cleburne majority distinguished,
the case of the facially neutral statute,30 presents greater diffi-
culties. A challenge to this type of law may not be cognizable
under the equal protection clause, or indeed any source of fed-
eral law."1 However, I urge that courts take their cue from Cala-
bresis2 in this context, and interpret neutral statutes as part of a
new landscape dominated by state and federal policy, as well as
social science research, favoring accommodation of the mentally
handicapped.83 Similarly, based on the approach of Landis3 4 and
Harlan,"8 I recommend that the common law of neutral restric-
tive covenants incorporate accommodational concerns.36 This is
necessary if mentally retarded persons seeking housing are to re-
ceive "the equal protection of the laws" in function as well as
form.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. Facts
The Cleburne plaintiffs sought to establish a group home
for the mentally retarded in an apartment house district identi-
fied as "R-3" under the local zoning ordinance."7 The ordinance
permitted multiple dwellings, boarding houses, residential ho-
tels, hospitals, sanitariums, and nursing homes."8 It required a
notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
30. See 105 S. Ct. at 3254 n.8.
31. Id. See also infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
32. See G. CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Calabresi].
33. See infra notes 132-89 and accompanying text.
34. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (R.
Pound ed. 1934).
35. See Moragne v. States Marine Line, 398 U.S. 375 (1970). See also infra notes
175-77.
36. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.




special permit, with an application signed by adjacent property
owners, for "[h]ospitals for the insane or feebleminded, or alco-
holic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions."39
The reference to the "feebleminded" had appeared in various
versions of the ordinance since 1947.0 Its apparent inspiration
was a similar allusion in a Dallas code enacted in 1929, ' just
after Justice Holmes' opinion in Buck v. Bell,4 2 and shortly after
the era in which titles like The Menace of the Feeble Minded in
Connecticut were "commonplace." 43
In Cleburne, the town advanced a number of reasons for de-
nying plaintiffs a permit. First, they cited the "negative atti-
tudes" of nearby property owners, whose signatures were neces-
sary under the ordinance. Next, it cited two factors related to
the home's proposed location. The home would be across the
street from a junior high school, and the town asserted that stu-
dents might harass home residents.45 In addition, the home was
to be located, like the rest of the district, on a "five hundred
year flood plain," which risked inundation every half-mil-
lenium.4a Other concerns which the town invoked included un-
certainty about legal responsibility for the actions of home resi-
dents,47 fire safety, 48 and congestion, both in the home and
caused by the home in the community. 9
The District Court applied the rational basis test, the lowest
level of review available in equal protection cases,50 and upheld
the town's denial of a special permit. 1 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, applying the heightened or "middle level"
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3268 n.17 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41. Id.
42. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See also supra note 7.
43. See 105 S. Ct. at 3266 n.8 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).




48. Id. at 3260.
49. Id. at 3259-60.
50. See 105 S. Ct. at 3253 (discussing District Court decision). Courts often invoke
the rational basis test to uphold government regulation of business. See 105 S. Ct. at
3254, citing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (sustaining municipality's
selective ban on pushcart food vendors in French Quarter).
51. 105 S. Ct. at 3253.
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scrutiny employed in gender discrimination matters.5 2 It rea-
soned that the history of "unfair and often grotesque mistreat-
ment" of the mentally retarded tended to show that present dis-
crimination against them reflects "deep-seated prejudice."5 3
B. The Law
1. The Applicable Standard
Justice White, writing for the majority, noted that most
governmental decisions enjoy presumptive validity under the
equal protection clause.54 This presumption allows "democratic
processes" maximum leeway in correcting "improvident deci-
sions," while limiting the role of the federal judiciary, the least
democratic branch of government.55 Certain statutory classifica-
tions, however, isolate factors so irrelevant to any legitimate gov-
ernmental interests that the courts are obliged to review them
more carefully, as they are likely to "reflect prejudice and antip-
athy."5 Race, alienage, and national origin are classifications
which courts subject to "strict scrutiny." They survive judicial
review only if they are necessary for fulfillment of a "compelling
52. 726 F.2d 191, 196-200 (5th Cir. 1984). For a summary of some significant gender
discrimination decisions, see supra note 25. The Fifth Circuit noted that heightened
scrutiny was especially appropriate given the facts in Cleburne, in which the government
restricted the availability of housing, a vital resource. 726 F.2d at 199-200, citing J.W. v.
City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1983). Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (striking down Texas prohibition of public education for children of illegal aliens
on grounds that education is a significant, although not "fundamental," right).
53. 726 F.2d at 197.
54. 105 S. Ct. at 3254.
55. Id. Unlike executives and legislators, who must periodically submit themselves to
the pleasure of the electorate, federal judges are appointed for life. U.S. CONST. art. III §
1. By design, the federal judiciary is thus removed from the pressures of democratic
accountability. See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The
Court observed in Carolene Products that prejudice against minorities "may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 152 n.4. This footnote has set the tone for the
Court's subsequent development of equal protection jurisprudence. See J. ELY, DEMoc-
RACY AND DISTRUST (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1001 (1978). But see
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HAv. L. REv. 713 (1985) (suggesting that ra-
cial minorities might now be adequately represented in the political sphere).
56. 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
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state interest. 57 Restrictions on "fundamental rights" like vot-
ing" and travel" are similarly suspect.10 An intermediate level
of review is appropriate for classifications based on gender and
illegitimacy, which are also typically irrelevant to functional ca-
pacity."' These distinctions must be "substantially related to
a[n] ...important governmental interest.""'
The Cleburne majority decided that classifications based on
mental retardation require no more than the lowest standard of
review: they must serve a "rational" state interest.63 Justice
White noted that not even plaintiffs in the instant-case denied
that the mentally retarded suffer from a "reduced ability to cope
with and function in the everyday world."" Therefore, mental
retardation may be a relevant factor in the allocation of social
goods, different from irrelevant factors like race and gender."
An example of this relevance, not specified by Justice White,
might be employment as a surgeon. A mentally retarded person
would by definition lack the I.Q. and fine motor skills necessary
in such an occupation.
White also argued that, since the mentally retarded are a
57. Id.
58. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
59. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell, concurring)
(Alaska's preference for established residents over newcomers in apportionment of an-
nual mineral income violates right to travel); id. at 71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
61. Id. See also supra note 25, discussing gender discrimination cases.
62. 105 S. Ct. at 3255, citing Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
63. See 105 S. Ct. at 3255-58.
64. Id. at 3256 and n.9. See also supra note 2.
65. 105 S. Ct. at 3256. One could argue that, like race and gender, mental retardation
is an "immutable" characteristic, and that people should not be treated differently based
on factors they cannot control. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW 753-54 (9th ed.
1975) [hereinafter cited as G. GUNTHER]. The Cleburne majority dismissed this notion
with a wave to Ely:
Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she
can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that elected
officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. Moreover, classifications
based on physical disability and intelligence are typically accepted as legitimate,
even by judges and commentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The
explanation, when one is given, is that those characteristics (unlike the one the
commentator is trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate pur-
poses. At that point there's not much left of the immutability theory, is there?
See J. ELY, supra note 55, at 150 (footnote omitted), cited at 105 S. Ct. at 3256 n.10.
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diversified group with a wide range of disabilities, 66 a broad judi-
cially fashioned rule would be less appropriate than deference to
a legislature "guided by qualified professionals.
''67
In addition, White viewed the recent legislative gains" of
the mentally retarded as belying the need for more vigorous re-
view. New reform statutes, according to White, demonstrated
that democratic processes do work for the mentally retarded,
and that judicial action supplementing those mechanisms is un-
necessary. 9 Moreover, much new legislation targeting the needs
of this group assumes the existence of some relevant differences
between the mentally retarded and others.70 A heightened stan-
dard might raise lawmakers' doubts about the validity of relying
on such assumptions, thus leading them to "refrain from acting
at all."
'71
Finally, White observed, identifying the mentally retarded
as a "quasi-suspect" class would make it difficult to deny the
same status to other groups with special traits, like the "aging,
the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. '72 The majority
did not wish to work this kind of marked expansion in equal
protection doctrine.7
2. Applying the Standard
Having explained at some length why rational basis review,
usually just a rubber stamp for governmental decisions, 4 was
appropriate, Justice White rather casually applied this standard
to strike down the challenged ordinance. The majority first de-
66. 105 S. Ct. at 3256.
67. Id. For a case ceding substantial discretion to professionals in dealing with condi-
tions in institutions for the mentally retarded, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
321-25 (1982).
68. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
69. 105 S. Ct. at 3256-57. Justice White cited one federal statute, the Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010 (1), (2) (1983), which
states that mentally retarded persons should receive services in a setting "least restric-
tive of [their] personal liberty." 105 S. Ct. at 3256. Interestingly, the Court had previ-
ously held, in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), that this
statute was merely precatory, and conferred no enforceable rights.
70. 105 S. Ct. at 3257.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3257-58.
73. Id. at 3258.
74. See supra note 50.
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cided to review the ordinance only "as applied" in this particu-
lar matter, in order to avoid "unnecessarily broad constitutional
judgments. 75 White then dismissed what might be called the
"subjective" strand of defendants' justifications for denying a
special permit, the "negative attitudes" of adjacent property
owners.76 Since such views, if given credence, could support even
the most invidious discrimination," the Court looked for more
objective criteria.78
The Court found these criteria, like fear of congestion, fire,
flooding, and other problems, 9 unconvincing because defendants
did not apply them uniformly. Nothing about the proposed
group home would have been objectionable if it had been associ-
ated with the wide spectrum of uses permitted under the ordi-
nance, including boarding houses, hospitals, nursing homes, or
family dwellings. 80 The home met all state and federal standards
for group housing in the community.8 1 The record supplied no
reason for treating a group home differently from the ordi-
nance's permitted uses. 2 According to the Court, defendants'
objective justifications were essentially pretexts for acting on
"irrational prejudice."88
C. Other Justices' Views
Justice Stevens, along with Chief Justice Burger, agreed
with the majority's result, but wrote separately to express his
dissatisfaction with the entire tier or level system which the
75. 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
76. Id. at 3259. Cf. Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982). In
Cornwell, the court upheld a district court decision finding a community group liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiring to deny the mentally retarded the equal protec-
tion of the laws, and conspiring to "prevent and hinder" the state from providing equal
protection to the mentally retarded. The community group, upon learning that the state
had contacted local officials about acquiring a house to use as a community residence for
the mentally retarded, purchased the property. It then sought to sell the house for a
figure which, it told prospective buyers, was "below the market price to defeat New
York's plan to use [the house] as a community residence. . . ." 695 F.2d at 38. The
group repeatedly declined to sell the property to New York State. Id.
77. 105 S. Ct. at 3259.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3259-60.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 3260, citing 42 CFR § 442.447 (1984).
82. 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
83. Id.
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Court has developed under the equal protection clause. The tier
structure, Stevens asserted, serves to obscure, rather than ex-
plain the "decisional process. 84 Stevens urged the universal
adoption of a flexible rational basis test, something like the one
the majority employed in Cleburne.85 This standard could ac-
commodate what Stevens saw as the "continuum of judgmental
responses to differing classifications" at the heart of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence."'
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Black-
mun, wrote to protest the majority's rejection of heightened or
middle-tier scrutiny. Marshall contended that this rejection,
coupled with the majority's "as applied" approach,87 furnishes
little guidance for future courts and players.88 This is particu-
larly dangerous, the Justice continued, because the Cleburne
majority in fact, if not in rhetoric, applied a test more probing
than the traditional rational basis rubber stamp.89 Bewildered
lower courts might extend this invigorated standard into inappo-
site areas, like government regulation of commerce.9 0 In addi-
tion, while Marshall conceded that mental retardation might be
a relevant factor in allocating certain social goods, the Cleburne
result showed it could also be irrelevant. According to Marshall,
the government should bear the burden on this issue.9 1 Marshall
also attacked the majority for citing recent reform legislation as
a reason to resist heightened judicial scrutiny. The Court, he ob-
served, had not let such political developments affect its analysis
84. Id. at 3261.
85. Id. at 3261-63.
86. Id. at 3260-61.
87. Id. at 3272-75. For further criticism of the Court's "as applied" analysis, see The
Supreme Court, 1984 Term: Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 120, 170-73 (1985).
88. Id. at 3265.
89. Id. at 3264-65.
90. Id. at 3265, citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the
Court applied an invigorated rational basis test to strike down a law establishing maxi-
mum hours for bakery employees. The majority's "substantive due process" inquiry, with
its emphasis on the "liberty" of employers and employees to bargain freely about hours
and other job features, bears a kinship to the more modern fundamental rights equal
protection decisions. Cf. G. GUNTHER, supra note 65, at 567. See also supra notes 58-60
and accompanying text. Lochner and its progeny in the area of economic and social regu-
lation, see, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down minimum
wage law), are "now universally acknowledged to have been constitutionally improper."
See J. ELY, supra note 55, at 14-15.
91. 105 S. Ct. at 3270-71.
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in the area of race, which was still deemed suspect despite com-
parable legislative activity.
2
II. THE CENTRAL Cleburne PRINCIPLE: UNDERINCLUSIVENESS
TRIGGERS MORE SEARCHING REVIEW
Although Justice Marshall accused the Cleburne majority of
leaving lower courts without guidance,98 the majority's decision
actually has a clear fulcrum: the lack of "fit" between the lan-
guage of Cleburne's zoning ordinance and the objectives ostensi-
bly served by the town's denial of a special group home permit.
This "means focused"'94 analysis, much like its younger sister
standard, middle-level scrutiny,95 seeks to determine whether
governmental classifications are substantially related to impor-
tant state objectives. It follows from two common flaws of rules,
including laws.
Some rules purport to cope with a particular mischief, but
only cover part of it. Such rules are called "underinclusive."''
Other rules also target a given mischief, but cover persons or
situations which do not contribute to the mischief. These rules
are referred to as being "overinclusive. ' '97 Sometimes, rules can
be both 5 Governments are not obliged to fashion a perfect fit,
92. Id. at 3269. But see Ackerman, supra note 55 (arguing that increased political
power of racial minorities weakens case for constitutional protections).
93. Id. at 3272-75.
94. See Gunther, supra note 7, at 20-37. Unlike substantive due process and funda-
mental rights equal protection analysis, which limit the ends which government can ac-
complish, means scrutiny inquires only about the evenhandedness with which govern-
ment promotes ends. One commentator has termed means scrutiny an "avoidance
device." Id. at 26-27. This type of analysis "does not disable any governmental body
from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation
must have a broader impact." Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-
13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring), cited in Gunther, supra, at 22-23. However, even if a
broader measure would be constitutionally permissible, the very fact that it would affect
much larger numbers of people creates a risk of "political retribution" that contains offi-
cial action almost as comprehensively as a finding of constitutional infirmity. 336 U.S. at
112-13, cited in Gunther, supra, at 23. For this reason, the Court employs means analysis
sparingly. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
96. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 28, at 346-53.
97. Id. at 351-52.
98. Id. at 352-53. To illustrate this, the authors cited Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943), in which the Court upheld a federal statute, enacted after the United
States entered World War II, which classified all "American citizens of Japanese ances-
try" as creating a threat of sabotage. Since other persons, including Americans of Ger-
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particularly in areas of affirmative largesse like the availability
of cash benefits 99 or novel criminal defenses. 100 Nevertheless,
governments should not act arbitrarily,101 or with prejudice
against any one group. 10 2 Too loose a fit promotes the inference
that the objective advanced is only a pretext for accomplishing
impermissible objectives. 03
In Cleburne, the application of the challenged ordinance
was patently underinclusive. Its purposes, according to the town,
were, inter alia, minimizing congestion and insuring flood and
fire safety.10 4 Yet, the permit process did not affect major uses
like hospitals, nursing homes, or dormitories, which could be ex-
pected to pose much greater problems than a group home.10 5 In
light of this functional underinclusiveness, the Court declined to
man and Italian ancestry, were also likely saboteurs under this logic, the statute was
underinclusive. Additionally, since not all Americans of Japanese descent were traitors, it
was also overinclusive. Interestingly, the Court cited national emergency as a basis for
leaving the law untouched.
99. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970) (since state has no consti-
tutional obligation to provide welfare benefits, invalidating limit on number of depen-
dents in family eligible for benefits might force state to eliminate benefits entirely).
100. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-09 (1977). In Patterson, the Court
held that a state may constitutionally shift the burden of proof to a criminal defendant
to establish diminished capacity. It reasoned that if the defense was too easy to make, no
state would give defendants the option.
101. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (striking down statute
which extinguished timely filed handicap discrimination claim if state Commission,
through inadvertence, failed to convene factfinding conference within 120 days of filing).
102. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In
Moreno, the Court struck down a section of the Food Stamp Act which excluded any
household containing an individual who was unrelated to any other member of the
household. Legislative history indicated that Congress intended to. prevent "so-called
'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the food stamp program." 413 U.S.
at 534, citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, at 8; 116 Cong. Rec. 444439 (1970) (Sen.
Holland).
103. For example, in United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535,
the government asserted that the exclusion of households containing any unrelated per-
sons helped minimize fraud in the food stamp program. The Court noted, however, that
those recipients with sufficient resources to render them ineligible for the program could
simply alter their living arrangements, thus avoiding the rule. Id. at 537-38 (quoting Cal-
ifornia Social Welfare Director). Only people so poor that they had to double up in living
quarters to afford accommodations would be hurt. Yet, these people, because of their
paucity of resources, would virtually always be otherwise eligible for food stamps. Ac-
cording to the Court, an "anti-fraud" provision which targeted people who could not
possibly be guilty of fraud was "wholly without any rational basis." Id. at 538.
104. 105 S. Ct. at 3259-60.
105. Id.
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credit the town's putative rationale. 10 6
Underinclusiveness in zoning can involve "area" restric-
tions, as well as the kind of "use" restriction struck down as ap-
plied in Cleburne. While use restrictions curtail the possible
uses of land (like group homes and hospitals), area restrictions
specify the size and shape of individual parcels (such as dimen-
sions of rear-yards and driveways). A town cannot consistently
grant area variances to other uses, and then deny them to a
group home.
10 7
A useful complement to functional disparities is what I will
call "chronological underinclusiveness." In this situation, a town
with a use-permissive ordinance, allowing for hospitals and dor-
mitories, with no mention of group homes, changes the law to
expressly exclude group homes when it receives its first applica-
tion to establish one. This is even stronger evidence of discrimi-
natory purpose. 08 Such a law would probably fall, even if the
town expressly barred new hospitals, nursing homes, and the
like, too, if the ordinance "grandfathered" existing nonconform-
106. See also Galioto v. Dept. of the Treasury, 602 F. Supp. 682 (D. N.J. 1985), va-
cated as moot, 106 S. Ct. 2683 (1986). In Galioto, the court applied rational basis review
to invalidate a statute which denied former mental patients the right to contest a bar on
their purchase of firearms, but extended that right to others, including certain convicted
felons. 602 F. Supp. at 688-90.
In addition to underinclusiveness, the Cleburne Court may have relied on the his-
tory of abuse of the mentally retarded, see supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text, and
on the importance of the interest which plaintiffs advanced. The District Court had
found that the disputed ordinance deprived the mentally retarded of access to commu-
nity housing. 105 S. Ct. at 3253. This benefit, although "not fundamental," is obviously
"very important." Id. (paraphrasing District Court). Together with underinclusiveness
and a history of abuse of the retarded, denial of such a crucial benefit provides a compel-
ling justification for a closer look at the challenged statute. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982) (disadvantaged class, illegal alien children, deprived of important bene-
fit, public education); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (level of scrutiny related, inter alia, to "societal impor-
tance of the interest adversely affected"); Note, Constitutional Law: Activating the Mid-
dle Tier After Plyler v. Doe: Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 38 OKLA. L.
REv. 145 (1985).
107. See Human Development Services of Portchester, Inc. v. Village of Port
Chester, 493 N.Y.S.2d 481 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1985). The court observed that, "In the
absence of a rational explanation for the denial, the frequency of granting other yard-
setback variances, in some instances of far greater magnitude, suggest that the respon-
dent zoning board engaged in a subtle form of discrimination against petitioner ....
Id. at 486.
108. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U.S. 252,267 (1977) (dicta on racial discrimination).
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ing uses. Grandfathering would simply perpetuate functional un-
derinclusiveness, with its inference of discrimination.
The Cleburne standard therefore encompasses underinclu-
siveness in all mixed-use, i.e., more than one-family-home-only,
communities. The majority's decision may have formally invali-
dated the ordinance only "as applied." Despite Justice Mar-
shall's concern about the narrowness of that holding, however,
the logic of the decision extends much further.
III. THE LAWMAKERS' DILEMMA: RULES VERSUS STANDARDS
Much law derives from the conflict between the two crucial
values of flexibility and certainty. Without certainty in the law,
people have no sure way of discerning their obligations, and act-
ing accordingly.10 9 Since many laws "substantially affect ...
primary decisions respecting human conduct,"110 the result
would be paralysis in social and economic interaction. However,
law must also consider the different interests presented in each
case and the myriad factual contours which set cases apart. In a
given matter, a rule can be under or overinclusive. A single rule
which covers overly disparate cases provides certainty at the ex-
pense of flexibility. This trade-off can produce absurdity, cou-
pled with injustice.'
In the following discussion, the term "rule" refers to a clear,
precise dictate uniformly applied. Many statutes, particularly
penal statutes," 2 fit under this rubric.' 3 The term "standard,"
109. See, e.g., Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Le-
gal Process, 35 STAN. L. REv. 213, 232-34 (1983); Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S.
CAL. L. REv. 151 (1981); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
110. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
111. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 109, at 277-78, citing Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506
(1889). In Riggs, the court declined to follow the New York Probate Code's clear com-
mand governing inheritance, since the heir had murdered the decedent. Permitting the
heir to inherit, the court asserted, would have been "manifestly contradictory to common
reason." 115 N.Y. at 511.
112. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.25 (McKinney 1975) (defining burglary).
113. But see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies "in restraint of trade." This is much closer to a common
law formulation, subject to ongoing definition by the courts. Of course, non-statutory law
also has developed certain rules. A good example is the bar on parol evidence to supple-
ment the terms of a written contract. See Kennedy, supra note 109, at 1691-92. This
type of rule has the same objective as a similarly clear statutory provision: it is designed
to foster certainty among parties and instrumentalities, like courts, called upon to review
19861
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on the other hand, refers to a looser test with more room for the
exercise of judicial discretion.
Cleburne nicely illustrates the tension between these two
paradigms in the constitutional arena. Much of the Court's mod-
ern jurisprudence, particularly equal protection, has involved
the "statutorification" of certain glosses on constitutional text.
The architecture of the tier system is one manifestation of this
trend. In the area of de jure" 4 discrimination against racial mi-
norities, for example, the Court has been at pains to eliminate
legal nooks or crannies where bigots might take comfort." 5 The
rationale for a rule here resides in the "fit" of the command: it is
difficult to envision a situation where a decisionmaker legiti-
mately takes race into account."" Therefore, forbidding acting
on bias against racial minorities does not stifle any worthwhile
activity.
In a growing number of cases, however, the Court has felt
the need to probe governmental decisionmaking without the cal-
cification born of formulating comprehensive rules." 7 These
cases owe more to the accretional, common law model of consti-
tutional adjudication discerned by Justice Stevens.ll1 This ap-
the parties' actions. Id.
114. See Keyes v. School Dist. #1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). In Keyes, the
Court defined de jure segregation as encompassing not only statutorily mandated dual
school systems, but also any deliberate official action aimed at separation of the races.
413 U.S. at 201-03.
115. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (existence of de jure discrimination in 1954 was
evidence of discrimination more than 20 years later). See also Hunter v. Underwood, 105
S. Ct. 1916, 1922-23 (1985) (statute concededly enacted with discriminatory purpose vio-
lates equal protection, even though it would be valid if reenacted without such motive).
Outside of the racial discrimination/equal protection context, a good example of
"statutorification" is Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court
fashioned an incantation which arresting officers could recite to all suspects to defeat an
inference of coercion under the fifth amendment.
116. This statement does not address "affirmative action" to aid minorities. As Ely
points out, this type of classification does not necessarily call for corrective judicial ac-
tion, since there is no reason to suppose that the political process has broken down when
a majority elects to discriminate against itself. J. ELY, supra note 55, at 170-72. A major-
ity, as opposed to a "discrete and insular" minority, has sufficient political power to
eliminate such discrimination if it wishes. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
117. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See also United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), discussed supra, notes 102-03. Cf. Gunther,
supra note 7.
118. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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proach is well-suited to the particular problems posed by mental
retardation. As the Court pointed out in Cleburne,"9 the case
against all discrimination based on the presence of mental retar-
dation is not quite as clear as it is with race. A blanket rule
would be overinclusive. It would encompass legitimate regula-
tion, like prohibiting those suffering from mental retardation
from practicing surgery or handling "hazardous equipment.
1 20
It might also render problematic arguably benign classifications,
like a state statute which sweeps aside restrictive zoning ordi-
nances but specifies a more focused procedure solely for the es-
tablishment of group homes for the mentally disabled.12 1 Al-
though Justice Marshall contended that such classifications
would survive heightened scrutiny,' 22 he neglected to appraise
the strength of a rule with so many acknowledged exceptions.
The fact that a state must show an important need support-
ing any quasi-suspect classification makes heightened scrutiny
even more awkward here. Some view judicial authority as a
"wasting asset,"'"" which deteriorates when invoked. Under that
perspective, a rule shifting the burden of proof to a state to jus-
tify barring the mentally retarded from the practice of surgery
sounds like a good way to undermine faith in the courts. This
effect would not help the judiciary remedy real discrimination.
Marshall's argument that Cleburne's means scrutiny-in-
fact-but-not-name is itself overinclusive does not persuade. The
Justice speculated that business and commerce regulation might
fall under the Cleburne spell of invigorated rational basis re-
119. See 105 S. Ct. at 3255-58.
120. See 105 S. Ct. at 3262 (Stevens, J., concurring). However, Justice White's argu-
ment that the mentally retarded are a "diversified" group with varying abilities, id. at
3256, undercuts rather than supports his position. If some mentally retarded persons are
functionally almost identical to persons without cognitive impairments, id., there is less
reason to assume the "relevance" of classifications based on mental retardation.
121. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). Cf. Schonfeld,
"Not in My Neighborhood": Legal Challenges to the Establishment of Community Resi-
dences for the Mentally Disabled in New York State,. 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1985).
122. See 105 S. Ct. at 3271-72.
123. See 0. Fiss. THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 82 (1978). Fiss, who does not share
this view, cites it in discussing the propriety of issuing a permanent injunction when
"irreparable harm" may not occur. A court imposes no hardship on a party, according to




view.124 Here, however, Marshall may have let his concern for
bright line rules cloud his view of the limits of stare decisis. The
facts of Cleburne, which yield the inference of "irrational
prejudice,' 2 5 have little to do with regulation of commerce. A
statute dealing with commerce would yield a different result: it
is difficult to envision a modern court perceiving prejudice when
government sets controls on, say, the sale of eyeglasses.' 26 The
accretional process of non-statutory law thus has its own protec-
tions against the rigidification that Marshall feared.
IV. Cleburne AND FACIAL NEUTRALITY: JUDICIAL UPDATING OF
STATUTES AND COVENANTS
There are two types of vehicles for excluding group homes.
One type of statute or covenant is expressly and specifically ex-
clusory. Cleburne's ordinance, which barred "homes. . .for the
insane or feeble-minded, 2  fits into this category. The other ex-
clusionary vehicle simply zones out all uses except for residence
by single families. 2 8 Since this device is not selectively exclusive,
like the Cleburne ordinance, which allowed hospitals, nursing
homes and other dormitory uses, the underinclusiveness princi-
ple does not apply.
The Supreme Court has declined to find equal protection
violations arising from such ordinances. Indeed, the Court has
held that local police power is "ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.' 29 The
Cleburne majority distinguished this set of facts. 3 " If a commu-
nity with a single-family ordinance grants many use variances,
underinclusiveness in the variance process might usher in equal
124. 105 S. Ct. at 3265.
125. 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
126. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (upholding statute
on rational basis grounds).
127. See 105 S. Ct. at 3252 n.3.
128. See Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and
Zoning Comm'n, 314 S.E.2d 218, 219-20 (Ga. 1984). Cf. Lippincott, "A Sanctuary for
People": Strategies for Overcoming Zoning Restrictions on Community Homes for Re-
tarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REv, 767 (1979).
129. Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. at 9 (Douglas, J.).
130. 105 S. Ct. at 3254 n.8.
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protection doctrine. 3' Otherwise, the Constitution may be of lit-
tle help in such situations. Therefore, another strategy is
necessary.
This strategy requires a new interpretation of the state or
local statute. It derives from the ideas of Calabresi, as articu-
lated in A Common Law For the Age of Statutes.'32 Calabresi
identifies the problem of obsolete laws which remain on the
books after social and economic arrangements have evolved be-
yond them. The task of the judge, Calabresi posits, is to assay
the relevant "legal topography"'133 in order to pinpoint statutes
in need of updating. Legal topography includes both state and
federal statutes, case law, and scholarship."'
Calabresi's most radical suggestion is that a court's view of
the prevailing legal topography should take precedence over its
perception of legislative intent.' 5 If the two conflict, according
to Calabresi, topography should guide the court's decision.
Moreover, the court should be candid about its disregard for the
original purpose of the legislature.' 3
Any deviation from the search for legislative intent raises
difficulties. Nevertheless, earlier commentators have advised
against a slavish deference to legislative intent when an enact-
ment which is not completely clear on its face trenches on signif-
icant institutional interests.'3 7 Courts have also invoked fictive
concepts of intent in similar circumstances. 3 8 However, Cala-
bresi is almost alone in urging a frank defiance of clearly dis-
cernible legislative objectives.' 8
This "pure" Calabresian position may not be necessary to
deal with most neutral ordinances applied to exclude group
homes. Local ordinances rarely generate any legislative his-
tory. 40 Their text is the only guide to meaning. Therefore, as
131. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
132. See Calabresi, supra note 32.
133. Id. at 129-31.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 32, at 87-89.
136. Id. at 88-90.
137. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 182, 184-85 and accompanying text.
139. For a similar approach, apparently arrived at independently of Calabresi, see
Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the
Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 892, 912-15 (1982).
140. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
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Llewellyn argued, the "sound quest" for a court is deciding
"what the words can be made to bear, in making sense in the
light of the unforseen."'' One-family residence statutes are
often susceptible to a functional interpretation which encom-
passes small congregate facilities like group homes. 42 Other
components of legal topography gravitate in the same direction.
In the case of group homes, the legal topography suggests
that courts should modify one-family use statutes to permit
group homes of a size and character consistent with the sur-
rounding community. National policy, expressed in federal stat-
utes, supports this view. 4 ' So does state policy. Many states
have enacted laws which classify group homes for the mentally
disabled as single-family households.144 Other jurisdictions, in-
cluding Texas, have conferred on the mentally retarded, "the
right to live in the least restrictive setting appropriate to [their]
individual needs and abilities," including "the right to live...
in a group home.' 45 Courts have also recognized the unobtru-
siveness of such facilities in a single-family setting. 46 One court
has observed that,
[I]n terms of the day-to-day activities of its inhabitants,
the . . . property is not employed in a manner which is
significantly different from that of neighboring houses ex-
cept for the fact that most of those who dwell within it
are mentally retarded.
47
Social science research has established that group home resi-
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1269 (tent. ed. 1958).
141. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400-01 (1950).
142. See infra notes 145, 147, and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
145. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., Art. 5547-300, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
146. See Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1981); State v.
Dist. Court, 609 P.2d 245, 248 (Mont. 1980); Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993
(1976); Group House v. Town of North Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 209-
11 (1978) (foster home); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 313
N.W.2d 756, 758 (foster home); Village of Freeport v. Ass'n for the Help of Retarded
Children, 94 Misc.2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 60 A.D.2d 644, 400
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1977); J.T. Hobby & Son v. Family Homes, 302 N.C. 64,72,274 S.E.2d 174,
180 (1981); Philadelphia Center for Development Services v. Plymouth Township, 492
A.2d 1191 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
147. See J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes, 302 N.C. at 72, 274 S.E.2d at 180.
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dents do not appreciably contribute to antisocial behavior or
other negative trends in the community.148 Property values do
not decrease,"90 and may even increase. 50 In fact, available data
suggests that neighborhoods' fear of group homes itself becomes
obsolete after a home has opened.151 One case tells the story of a
man who "led the opposition" to a community residence in his
community. He now "regards his retarded neighbors as his
friends; he visits them in their home, and they visit him in
his." 52 He also works with other communities to help them ac-
cept group homes. 58 This evidence should inform interpretation
of one-family use statutes.
A court can resort to fiction to interpret a statute in light of
policies protecting the mentally disabled. In Ford v. Civil Ser-
vice Employees Association,'5 4 the court vacated an arbitrator's
award reinstating an employee of the New York State Office of
Mental Health who had sexually abused a patient. Citing a sec-
tion of the New York Mental Hygiene Law which required that
patients receive services "with full respect for [their] dignity and
personal integrity,"' 55 as well as other statutes,' 5" the court as-
148. See Okolo & Guskin, Community Attitudes toward Community Placement of
Mentally Retarded Persons, 12 INT'L REV. OF RESEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION 25, 52-
53 (1984) (citing studies).
149. Id. at 53. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 572 F.
Supp. 1300, 1340-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir.
1984); Northwest Residence, Inc. v. City of Brooklyn Center, 352 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.
App. 1984) (citing study finding no decrease in property values absent saturation level,
i.e. five facilities within one block). But see Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio
St.2d 259, 269, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1380 (1980) (testimony of one real estate broker).
A nonprofit group in Connecticut recently filed suit against the Greenwich Tax Re-
view Board, which had lowered assessments on homes near a halfway house for former
mental patients. The suit alleges illegal discrimination under both state and federal law.
See 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 309 (1985).
150. See J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes, 302 N.C. at 68 n.7, 274 S.E.2d at
178 n.7 (citing study by National Association of Realtors).
151. See ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 196 ("once the home was in business, indifference
and even occasionally approval took over"); Okolo & Guskin, supra note 148, at 58
("some evidence that opposition . . . reduces over time").
152. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. at 1340-
41.
153. Id.
154. 94 A.D.2d 262, 464 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1st Dept. 1983).
155. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.03(a) (McKinney 1978), cited in 94 A.D.2d at 264,
464 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
156. See NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 260.25 (McKinney 1980) (endangering the welfare
of a person incompetent by reason of mental illness); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (McKin-
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serted that the award affronted public policy "by making light of
the State's fiduciary responsibility to its wards.' 157 Moreover,
the award had characterized the sexual abuse as "minimal," an
adjective which the court said was "appalling" in this context.""
Upholding the award would "discourage citizens from entrusting
their loved ones to state care and defeat the very purpose for
which the Mental Hygiene Law was enacted."'5 9 The court de-
scribed the award as "plainly irrational,"' 0 and held that the
arbitrator had "exceeded his power."16 This was a rare result,
reached in the face of the "traditional rule that an arbitrator's
decision is not reviewable .. .[even where there has been an]
egregious disregard for the state of the law and the facts."'' 6 The
court made an essentially fictive connection between the result
and the language and purpose of the statute governing vacatur
of arbitration awards. 1
s
ney 1975) (defining rape as intercourse with an of-age female incapable of consent); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.17 (McKinney 1978) (female patient transported from ward must
be accompanied by another female, or by male family member), cited in 94 A.D.2d at
264-65, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 483.





162. 94 A.D.2d at 265, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 483-84, citing, inter alia, Port Washington
Union Free School Dist. v. Port Washington Teachers Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 411, 419, 380
N.E.2d 280, 285-86 (1978) (Breitel, J., concurring).
163. The applicable statute is N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 7511 (McKinney 1980). Subsec-
tion 7511 (b)(1) (iii) mandates vacatur if an arbitrator "exceeded his power." This provi-
sion, however, seems less related to questions of broad public policy than it is to more
mundane and concrete issues, such as whether the award is consistent with express terms
contained in the contract which the arbitrator construed. See In re Arbitration between
Granite Worsted Mills and Aaronsen Cowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 255 N.E.2d 168 (1969)
(award of $3,700.00 for delivery of damaged goods set aside when contract specifically
limited damages to $1,000 or less). In Ford, no contract term prohibited reinstatement of
an employee under the circumstances involved. The court, which never mentioned the
relevant statute, also never directly addressed the question of legislative purpose. Its sub
silentio premise was that the legislature could not have intended such an absurd result.
Yet, the court never stated this clearly, or explained why the award was materially dif-
ferent from other legally and/or factually "wrong" outcomes which parties stipulating to
arbitration must accept as the price of utilizing a less formal and costly alternative to
litigation. Ford actually owes little to conventional methods of statutory interpretation.
It is much more like a common law supplement to legislative action, albeit one which
relies heavily on other statutes to inform its value judgments. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, Ford fits squarely within Calabresi's thesis.
The British House of Lords, in a decision vindicating confidential access to medi-
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Despite courts' willingness to modify statutes through reli-
ance on fiction, this approach and Calabresi's more overt
method present problems. Objections fall under two headings:
institutional competence and majoritarianism. 16 4 The Ford case
underscores the problem of institutional competence. Calabresi
assumes that judges are equal to the delicate task of evaluating
changes in legal topography and navigating accordingly.'65 Yet
judges vary widely in quality. Courts applying a Calabresian
analysis may be "voting their policy preferences in the guise of
overhauling obsolescent statutes."' 66 A similar danger exists in
the area of conflict of laws, where the reigning methodology calls
for a court to choose the applicable body of law through analysis
of each jurisdiction's "interest" in the controversy.'17 This stan-
dard permits greater flexibility than the traditional mechanistic
rules, which might require that, for example, in an accident case,
the law of the situs apply, regardless of the residences of the
parties or the location of the insurer.' 68 "Interests analysis"
takes for granted that courts are competent to identify interests.
cally prescribed contraceptives and birth control advice for teenage females, has also
interpreted an established statute in light of present-day policy concerns. In Gillick v.
West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and another, [1985] 3 All E.R. 402,
[1985] 3 All E.R. 830, discussed in Cowper, London Letter: Contraceptive Advice for
Children, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 6, 1985, at 2, col. 3, the majority upheld guidelines issued by the
defendant regulating the availability of confidential medical contraceptive advice to girls
under sixteen against a parental challenge based on Section 28 of the Sexual Offences
Act of 1956. Section 28 declares it illegal for any person to "cause or encourage" sexual
intercourse with a girl under sixteen years old for whom the person is responsible. The
Law Lords, in a split decision, declined to include doctors within the persons covered by
the Act. They cited the increase in pregnancies among under-age females and the con-
temporary frequency of sexual experimentation among this population, as well as the
importance of the physician-patient privilege, as justifications. The majority adopted
this instrumental, policy-oriented analysis despite the accessibility of an alternative ra-
tionale closer to norms of statutory interpretation, which might have limited the Act's
purpose to combatting procurement and child abuse by parents, foster parents, and gov-
ernmental in loco parentis authorities, like schools.
The dissenters asserted that making contraceptive advice accessible would remove a
valuable disincentive to premature sexual exploration.
164. For a discussion of the implications of Calabresi's theory for majoritarian princi-
ples, see infra notes 170-86 and accompanying text.
165. See Weisberg, supra note 109, at 225-26.
166. See Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common
Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126, 1169 (1982).
167. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Currie,
Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171.
168.' See First Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934).
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However, this inquiry may be too metaphysical for courts to
handle. 69
The second problem with Calabresi derives from the status
of statutes as expressions of majoritarian will. There are two fac-
ets to this difficulty. The first refers to the use of other statutes,
besides the one being modified, as sources of policy. One can call
it the "legislative process" or "contract" quandary. Under this
formalist view, legislation is a product of compromise between
differing factions. The coverage of a statute, including § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act or the Education of the Handicapped
Children Act, figures as part of this compromise. 170 Courts in ef-
fect second-guess the legislature, the argument goes, when they
extend the statute's coverage by treating the statutory purpose
or ratio legis as an articulation of policy in cases like the group
home controversies where the statute itself does not apply.
17 1
This perspective offers a contrast to Landis' position that stat-
utes, like common law cases, are a rich source of analogy.1 72 Lan-
dis, taking an instrumental view, urged courts to use broad legis-
lative purposes to "slough off the archaisms in their own legal
structure. 17 8 This is known as the doctrine of the "equity of the
statute. '1 7' Justice Harlan followed Landis' lead in his much-
cited 7 5 opinion in Moragne v. States Marine Line. 76  In
169. See Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws - a Reply to Profes-
sor Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 463 (1960). Because of the nebulous nature of the inquiry,
interest analysis may create the risk of uncertain and inconsistent results. See Gen'l Tel.
Co. v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 460, 311 S.E.2d 460 (1984). Rules are useful because they mini-
mize uncertainty. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 815-26 (1980). In Mohasco! the
Court viewed strict time limitations on filing claims of racial discrimination in employ-
ment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (c) and (e), as
consideration for the statute's broad substantive sweep. But see Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (some Title VII time limits subject to equitable
modification).
171. See Posner, Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitu-
tion, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 263 (1982). Posner cites the lack of "assurance that the particular
constellation of political pressures" that yielded the statute was also at work in a subse-
quent situation. Id. at 274. Cf. Weisberg, supra note 109, at 231, citing J. AUSTIN, Lec-
tures on Jurisprudence 629 (5th ed. 1885). It is possible, however, that Austin was refer-
ring principally to interpreting a statute itself by reference to its supposed purpose,
without regard for its text. See J. AUSTIN, supra, at 629-30.
172. See Landis, supra note 34.
173. Id. at 216.
174. Id. at 214. See also Calabresi, supra note 32, at 85-86.
175. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 32, at 152 ("Moragne stands as a monument to
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Moragne, Harlan invoked policies favoring recovery for wrongful
death on the high seas set out in several non-applicable but
analogous modern statutes to justify abandoning the ancient
rule against wrongful death actions in admiralty. 177
The second part of the majoritarian objection deals with the
statute, like the single-family ordinance discussed in this sec-
tion, being judicially modified. The problem here is one of legiti-
macy. What right does the judge have to change the determina-
tions of a duly elected legislature? Austin, the great English
positivist, asserted that courts have no such prerogative. "[T]he
law," he wrote, "as a command, may continue to exist, although
its reason has ceased, and the law consequently ought to be ab-
rogated. ' 178 Critics of Calabresi have stressed that his model dis-
misses the importance of the hearings, debates, lobbying, and
horse trading17 9 which accompany the "dance of legislation."180
Unless a statute is repealed or amended through the same pro-
cess, critics argue, it has earned the right to respect as the "will
of the polity." 8''
what courts, aware of the fullness of techniques available to them, can do to update
laws"); Weisberg, supra note 109, at 254 (Moragne "nowhere changes any statutes");
Estreicher, supra note 166, at 1157-58.
176. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
177. See 398 U.S. at 388-402. See also Panama R. Co. v. Rock, 266 U.S. 209, 216
(1924) (Holmes, J., dissenting), cited in 398 U.S. at 391. In Panama R. Co., the majority
invoked the common law bar on wrongful death actions to avoid the influence of policies
embodied in more liberal legislation. Justice Holmes noted in dissent that, "courts in
dealing with statutes sometimes have been too slow to recognize that statutes even when
in terms covering only particular cases may imply a policy different from that of the
common law, and therefore may exclude a reference to the common law for the purpose
of limiting their scope."
178. J. AUSTIN, supra note 171, at 631. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618 (1978) (statute limiting damages in actions based on wrongful death on the high seas
to "pecuniary loss" precluded additional award for "loss of society"). But see Note,
supra note 139, at 897-98 (criticizing Court's abandonment of interpretive flexibility).
179. See Estreicher, supra note 166, at 1136-37.
180. E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION (1973).
181. Estreicher, supra note 166, at 1137. See also Group House of Port Washington,
Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 274-78, 380 N.E.2d 207, 211-13 (1978)
(Breitel, J., dissenting). In Group House, the Court of Appeals interpreted a single fam-
ily use ordinance to allow a small home for foster children. Chief Judge Breitel asserted
that the majority set out:
by an evasive process, to stretch the liberal interpretation to still another
and even more liberal application; and this could go on endlessly. Such a process
is not sound judicially and does not accord with principles of judicial restraint.
The worst of the matter is that the problem is easily soluble by legislative
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In the group home context, both the institutional and
majoritarian arguments have minimal impact. Statutes embody-
ing concern for accommodating the mentally disabled provide an
objectively ascertainable source of policy. These statutes also de-
lineate the Calabresian court's role here as not altering expres-
sions of majority will, but rather reconciling disparate
majoritarian manifestations.
This role encompasses a presumption that legislatures de-
sire some degree of harmony among their various enactments.
Legislatures rarely say this directly. However, courts frequently
interpret statutes in light of a fictive legislative intent, and con-
sider factors outside the contemplation of the enacting legisla-
ture. This is true of decisions holding that Congress must pro-
vide a clear affirmative textual indication that it intends
legislation to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states
under the eleventh amendment.' 82 Similar "clear statement"
rules' 83 apply to statutes imposing major fiscal burdens on states
as conditions for the receipt of federal funds under the spending
clause,' 8 ' and to statutes limiting courts' traditional equitable
change if indeed there is a legislative purpose to expand the areas in which
group homes may be established.
45 N.Y.2d at 278, 380 N.E.2d at 213.
Bickel stressed that no judicial decision will have a lasting practical effect unless it
ultimately commands majoritarian support, or at least acquiescence. See A. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 111 (1975). Available data suggest strongly that communities ac-
cept the presence of group homes. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985) (§ 504 of
Rehabilitation Act does not authorize retrospective (monetary) relief against states, since
Congress did not clearly manifest this intention); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976) (Congress specifically authorized backpay awards against states in statute barring
employment discrimination based on race); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (no
reimbursement of welfare benefits denied in violation of federal Social Security Act).
183. These rules of construction rely on a fictive, presumed legislative intent to main-
tain consistency with the general legal landscape. See Calabresi, supra note 32, at 215-
16. See also Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpre-
tation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547
(1963).
184. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 190 n.11 (1982) (declining to find
Congressional mandate to maximize, rather than only realize part of handicapped child's
educational potential under Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §
1400 et seq., absent clear legislative intent); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (declining to require states to provide institutional services for
the mentally retarded in "least restrictive environment" without textual statutory
command).
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discretion to select remedies for wrongdoing.1 8 5 Congress can do
all of these things, but it must say so expressly. Perhaps a com-
parable requirement is appropriate for single-family statutes, if
legislatures and city councils wish to use them to exclude group
homes. Legislatures would have to be careful in this area, how-
ever, to also expressly bar other non-single-family uses. Other-
wise, they could face the Cleburne underinclusiveness
problem. 186
The second kind of facially neutral device is a single-family-
only restrictive covenant. Modifying covenants is less problem-
atic than altering statutes, since a covenant is usually a private
arrangement with no formal majoritarian base. Moreover, equi-
table modification of a covenant, due to changed circumstances
which obviate the covenant's purpose, is an accepted judicial
technique. 187 Courts in New York and other jurisdictions have
also declined to enforce such covenants as inconsistent with
public policy favoring self-sufficiency for the mentally dis-
abled. 18 However, these jurisdictions typically have statutes
overriding local single-family ordinances.18 9 Modifying the ordi-
nance is a prerequisite for altering a covenant. This emphasizes
the urgency of the Calabresian stratagem for coping with statu-
tory obsolescence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mentally disabled people are emerging from the sea of igno-
rance and prejudice which until recently surrounded them. Fear
of this vulnerable population is still commonplace, however.
Hostility and distrust of the mentally disabled currently are
most pervasive in the area of housing. Yet housing for the men-
tally disabled is crucial if society wishes to avoid the twin evils
of institutionalization and homelessness.
185. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (upholding equita-
ble discretion not to enjoin ongoing violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.)
186. See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
187. See Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703 (4th Dist. 1982)
(enjoining enforcement of covenant against group home).
188. See, e.g., Crane Neck Ass'n, Inc. v. New York City/Long Island County Services
Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336 (1984). See also supra notes 172-77 and accom-
panying text (discussing doctrine of equity of statutes).
189. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
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Exclusionary zoning ordinances are one way of keeping out
housing, particularly small group homes, for the mentally dis-
abled. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburn Living Center, the Su-
preme Court struck down as applied an ordinance which singles
out group homes for special scrutiny, while permitting many
other more intrusive uses, like apartment houses and hospitals.
The Court declined, however, to hold that the mentally retarded
are a quasi-suspect class under the equal protection clause, and
therefore that all government decisions which single out the
mentally retarded carry the heavy burden of justification which
the Cleburne defendants failed to meet. Instead, the Court
opted for a more flexible standard based on whether the chal-
lenged classification was relevant to an important governmental
objective. This standard frees states to implement benign mea-
sures designed to help this population. It also permits them to
establish common sense criteria which may legitimately exclude
the mentally retarded in the allocation of certain social and eco-
nomic goods, like employment as a surgeon. At the same time,
the standard's focus on the inclusiveness of the classification,
like the hospitals and dormitories not included in the Cleburne
ordinance, combats obvious forms of discrimination.
More subtle exclusionary devices do not discriminate on
their face. Typically, they bar all non-single-family uses. The
Cleburne analysis may not reach this far. However, creative
courts anxious to reconcile land-use ordinances with state and
national policy and research favoring accommodation of the
handicapped should adopt the updating approach which Cala-
bresi advances. Considering accommodation and the unobtru-
siveness of group homes uppermost, courts should construe sin-
gle-family statutes to allow this important source of housing.
Calabresian maneuvering assumes a high degree of compe-
tence among judges. It also has some nettlesome implications for
the prevalent majoritarian model of statutory interpretation.
However, it is not altogether different from what courts have
long done, mainly in the guise of fiction. Because of the vital
needs at stake, a Calabresian gambit is worth the risk. Without
it, policies promoting housing for the mentally disabled may re-
main more rhetoric than reality.
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